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The Pound and The Hammer: An Analysis of the Effects of Finance
on Edward I’s Conquest of Wales and Scotland
Mackenzie Mohr

The idea of medieval conquest and war is one that has been immensely popular
in modern media, especially over the past century. Whether in movies, novels, or
television shows, this topic has been romanticized and adapted to a degree that
often makes it difficult to remember the reality of the events and cultures upon
which these adaptations are based. Additionally, in viewing the plethora of fantasy
and medievalist media, it is important to remember that war and conquest were
very real parts of medieval life. These wars and their consequences defined several
aspects of modern society; in fact, today’s geopolitical situation can arguably be
seen as a culmination of these conflicts and wars, with today’s borders and nation
states defined by the results of a long history of violence and battle. This reality is
most evident in the case of Europe, where centuries of war shaped a political landscape that is still very relevant to any discourse of modern politics. For example,
the modern concept of the United Kingdom is by no means a recent invention, as
entwined in its foundation are the results of centuries of medieval conflict and conquest, for it was the wars of multiple English kings that helped shape the political
borders and ties still present today. Debatably, among the most significant contributions to the unification of the United Kingdom are King Edward I’s wars of
conquest, namely those for the principality of Wales and the kingdom of Scotland.
While these nations had been entangled for centuries prior to these wars,
it was Edward I who bound them together under a single political overlordship. In
fact, Edward would be the last king to rule over the entire British mainland, creating a unified landscape that lasted nearly three hundred years and served in part as
the foundation of the modern United Kingdom (King and Etty 28). Edward I was
famed for his great military success as well as his advancements in English law
and politics, both of which can be seen in his endeavours in Wales and Scotland.
Although Edward was successful in bringing Scotland and Wales under his rule,
the circumstances surrounding the submission of the two nations were quite different. In his Welsh conquest—ended formally in 1284 with the Statute of Wales
at Rhuddlan—Edward fully annexed and incorporated Wales into his kingdom by
means of successful military conquest (“Statute of Wales” 422). However, his conPublished by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2018
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quest of Scotland, which followed a series of conflicts eventually settled in 1305,
was neither successful nor complete (King and Etty 28). Scotland was incorporated under Edward’s leadership through a political surrender by the Scots, rather
than by means of a decisive defeat; for this reason, the Scots were able to retain
control of their land under an English administration.
The subject of why Edward was successful in conquering Wales but not
Scotland has been much debated and discussed among scholars. Overall, however,
the two are difficult to compare because the circumstances of Edward’s kingdom
had shifted drastically between the two conflicts, which occurred years apart. The
financial situation of England was in a far worse state at the time of the Scottish
conquest than it had been with Wales, due to years of warring and expensive castle
building; additionally, the financial states of Wales and Scotland were very different, to the advantage of the Scots. Related to the resources available to each of
the involved parties, the differences in the administrative structure and capability
between Wales and Scotland were significant, with England facing a far more solidly developed administration in Scotland. Finally, and also related to the Crown’s
economic state, the military situation that Edward faced in each of his conquests
was completely changed: the English troops were well supplied and reinforced
in Wales, but in Scotland they faced difficulties with food supply and financing.
These circumstances rendered the English unable to capture a solid foothold in
Scotland before the supply difficulties of winter drove them back. All of these
factors are intrinsically linked to crucial role that finances played in medieval warfare. Ultimately, it was the change in England’s economic security at the time of
each conquest, especially when met with Wales’ lack of centralization in contrast
to Scotland’s well-established administration, that was the driving factor in the
outcome of Edward’s conquests.
One of the most essential resources to winning wars is money, and the
conquests of Edward I were a testament to that fact, as the kingdom’s financial situation played a critical role in his wars against Wales and Scotland and was crucial
in determining the outcome of both. Money and resources affect the number of
soldiers that can be employed, the duration of their employment, and their effectiveness in combat. Because of these factors, Edward’s financial situation came
into play in both conquests and demonstrated how drastically the circumstances
of the kingdom had changed in the years between his wars in Wales and Scotland.
In his conflict with Llywelyn ap Gruffydd, the Prince of Wales, Edward’s strong
financial position—especially compared to that of Wales—was key to his overall
victory, while his ability to create an effective supply line and replenish his troops
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with Welshmen during his actual campaign was key in his military success. In
contrast, Edward’s efforts to crush a nationwide rebellion in his conflict with the
Scots was a situation where Edward repeatedly faced financial crises due to years
of war and extensive castle-building programs. This lack of financial resources
thus hindered Edward’s military strength and success in Scotland.
There were two wars involved in the conquest of Wales: a brief campaign
in 1277 after tensions against Llywelyn came to a head, beginning with his refusal
to pay homage to Edward; and a far more serious and expensive war beginning
in 1282, in which Edward sought to completely subjugate the Welsh principality (Prestwich, Edward I 182). The first conflict was resolved fairly easily by the
English through combat and was concluded by a peace treaty, through which Llywelyn formally recognized Edward’s authority and severe indemnities were levied
on the Welsh (Prestwich, Edward I 181). The second—and more significant—of
the conflicts began in 1282, when the Welsh prince Dafydd, Llywelyn’s brother,
who supported Edward in his first attack, revolted after Edward did not supply
adequate rewards for his service (Prestwich, Three Edwards 14). Llywelyn and a
number of other Welsh lords then rose to support Dafydd against Edward (Prestwich, Three Edwards 14). The English quickly responded and saw much progress
early in the campaign, but faced numerous defeats in the south of Wales and a serious loss at Anglesey (Prestwich, Edward I 188–192). However, the English rallied,
receiving vital reinforcements from Gascony in November of 1282, and Llywelyn
was killed while attempting to move out of Snowdonia, leading to disaster for the
Welsh (Prestwich, Edward I 191–194). The resistance then quickly deteriorated,
and after Edward took Dolwyddelan Castle and secured Snowdonia, Dafydd was
soon captured and peace was made (Prestwich, Edward I 195–196).
While the English did achieve many important military victories in this
war, it was Edward’s vast resources that enabled him to defeat the Welsh—that,
and also his ability to replenish and supply his troops. Edward’s England was
one that, compared to Wales, was highly populated and rather wealthy. Edward’s
first financial advantage was his ability to receive income from many sources. For
example, in November 1282, summons were issued for county representatives to
appear at assemblies to grant a taxation to fund the war; in Northampton such a tax
was granted, thus providing Edward with significantly more funds going into the
conflict (Prestwich, Edward I 197). Additionally, Edward was able to muster large
numbers of paid soldiers—and even more who were unpaid, serving their feudal
duty—indicating the substantial wealth of resources at his disposal (Prestwich,
Edward I 196–197). The incomes of commerce, farming, and trade also supplied
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2018
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Edward’s coffers significantly. Analyzed comparatively, Edward’s resources were
far more substantial than those of Wales. Being far more sparsely populated and
situated largely on rough, infertile lands, Wales had far fewer opportunities for
generating income. For example, records show that Llywelyn earned a mere £17
annually from customs revenue, compared to Edward’s £10,000 in the same period
(Morris 136). To compound this difference, the Welsh faced extreme indemnities from the Treaty of Montgomery that established Llywelyn as Prince of Wales
(Morris 136–137). While this financial situation put England at an extreme advantage over Wales in Edward’s conquest, his ability to supply his troops proved to be
critical in the finances of the war.
Similarly, the enemy that Edward faced in Wales was one that was significantly less politically developed than those in either England or Scotland, which
would have serious effects on Edward’s success in Wales. As R.R. Davies points
out, “Llywelyn’s principality was never more than a loose federation kept together
by fear, success, and the force of his personality,” and thus under pressure of the
English, divisions soon became apparent (323). These divisions can be seen clearly
in the first Welsh war, where Llywelyn’s own brother Dafydd turned to Edward’s
cause. This benefited Edward greatly and would in the second war see Wales ultimately conquered. The division in the Welsh principality enabled Edward to maintain important Welsh allies, such as Gruffydd ap Gwenwynwyn of Powys. This too
benefited Edward by enabling him to replenish his troops with Welshmen, notably
while stationed at Rhuddlan (Prestwich, Edward I 186–190). While Edward took
advantage of the tensions of the Welsh lords, the overall primitivity of the Welsh
nation also improved Edward’s efforts. Wales was very sparsely populated and still
relied on self-sufficiency rather than on a market economy; furthermore, the use
of money was still relatively uncommon, complicating Llywelyn’s efforts to pose
a nationwide resistance (Prestwich, Edward I 171). Similarly, as Michael Prestwich points out, “there was not the tradition of taxation which existed in England”
(Edward I 173). This lack of taxation system would also cripple Llywelyn, providing much less income to fund his resistance. This situation that so benefited
Edward in Wales would be completely different from that of Scotland, the latter
being a well-established kingdom with more developed resources. This will be
later demonstrated in the analysis of Edward’s efforts in Scotland.
A major concern in any extended military venture is that of supplying
troops in enemy territory. Due to his vast finances and resources, Edward was
able to import a significant amount of provisions from England and Ireland. He
was able to collect 1500 quarters of wheat and 2000 quarters of oats from each of
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the English counties and even larger amounts of wheat and animals for food from
Ireland and Gascony, providing a large store of provisions and supplies for his
troops in the upcoming war (Prestwich, Edward I 198–199). Additionally, Edward
was able to maintain steady supply lines as he progressed through Wales, a crucial
variable in his victory. His allies along the Marches and the castles that he captured
along the coast of Wales, such as Cardigan and Carmarthen, enabled Edward to
stockpile supplies to feed his troops (Rowlands 43), which in turn enabled him
to wage a longer campaign, even through the winter. Lacking this ability in the
instance of Scotland would prove just as critical in his failure.
The financial state of the English Crown going into the Scottish conquest—as well as the situation in Scotland as a whole—was a stark contrast to that
of the expedition into Wales. After King Alexander III of Scotland died, along with
his only heir, Margaret, the Scots went to Edward to commit judgment upon which
claimant had the greatest right: that of John Balliol or of Robert Bruce (King and
Etty 16–19). Edward called representatives of the Scots to England, where he too
would pass judgment and, in the end, Balliol was chosen and installed in 1292
(King and Etty 16–19). However, when growing tensions between the Scots and
Edward came to a head, war broke out and Edward quickly moved through Scotland, where the resistance soon fell, following which Balliol submitted and was
taken captive (King and Etty 20–22). Edward then established an English administration, which the Scots largely opposed (King and Etty 23–24). This lack of
support became a public rebellion that was led by William Wallace and Andrew
Murray, who were joined by a number of Scottish nobles, and earned substantial
victory against the English puppet government at Stirling (King and Etty 23–24).
In the summer of 1298, Edward quickly mustered a large expeditionary force and
led it into Scotland, defeating Wallace at Falkirk. The conflict became a war of
attrition and soon Edward faced financial difficulties, forcing him on a number of
occasions to agree to truces with gains until 1302 (King and Etty 24–26). After
this, Edward was able to muster enough forces to launch an expedition into Scotland, sustained even in winter. Then, in 1304, the Scots surrendered, although
Edward had not by any means conquered the country (King and Etty 27). This lack
of military success is significant and its difference from the Welsh campaign had
much to do with the ultimate shift in Edward’s financial situation
The Edward who invaded Scotland was very different Edward from the
Edward who invaded Wales. This was a man who was economically strained, as
is evident in the results of this war. Following his successful campaign in Wales,
Edward famously engaged in an expansive castle-building program that yielded
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2018
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some of the most beautiful castles in history. These castles, with a scale and grandeur that had never before been seen in England and Wales, were enormously
expensive and their construction drained the Crown’s finances significantly. So
extreme were these expenses, that many of the castles, most notably Beaumaris,
were left incomplete (Rowlands 52). Nonetheless, by 1301, well into the struggle
with Scotland, the expenses of these castles and of the King’s works in Wales
reached some £80,000 (Rowlands 52). This financial situation was exacerbated by
the expenses overall in his Welsh wars, including payment for soldiers, supplies,
and loans taken by the Crown; the total of Edward’s expenses in Wales, including
the castles and his campaigns, reached £120,000 (Prestwich, Edward I 200). This
debt considerably limited his ability to wage war in Scotland, hindering his capacity of employing and, far more importantly, feeding and sustaining armies.
Edward’s financial difficulties and their disastrous effects on his attempt to
subdue Scotland were well known to him. The chronicle of Peter Langtoft, recognized for its authority on the reign of Edward I, includes a response by Edward to
his earls and barons in 1300 regarding the financial situation: “On another side, I
say to you, I am without money, / Of which I must have aid of my land, / If I am
to recommence the war of Scotland” (Langtoft 249). From this statement it is clear
that Edward realized the necessity of funds to the continued campaign in Scotland
and was in dire need of replenishment. This situation would affect Edward most
in his attempt to sustain the conflict in the winter, where a lack of money—and
therefore a lack of supplies and of food—would force Edward to contend with
desertion and make numerous retreats, thereby ceding any gains, driving his costs
even higher, and pushing military victory further away.
To understand how the financial difficulties of Edward’s England in his
campaign against Scotland were exacerbated, it is important to consider the nature
of his military approach, which differed significantly from that of his conquest in
Wales. While Edward was quickly feeling the economic stress on his campaign
due to his previous expenses, he faced a much more formidable task in feeding his
men because of the increased size of his force. In Wales, Edward rarely had more
than a few thousand men in a single army, with the total of his infantry reaching a
height of 15,000 men when it swelled at Rhuddlan, and, considering the aforementioned accessibility of supplies, the English did not have any severe difficulties
feeding troops (Morris 155). In Scotland, however, the English mustered much
larger forces on many occasions. For example, in response to the Scottish victory
at Stirling, where the English puppet administration suffered disastrously, Edward
mustered an enormous force of some 28,000 men in the summer of 1298 (King
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and Etty 25). Amassing the resources necessary to supply and maintain this force
was extremely difficult, especially on a regime already facing financial stress.
While this muster did prove successful at the crucial victory at Falkirk, its funding
and supply issue grew quickly out of hand and Edward was forced to cease his
expedition until the following winter (King and Etty 25). The Scots recaptured
much of what the English had gained, and, when Edward was once again able to
raise a fighting force in preparation for the upcoming winter campaign, his muster
resulted in a pitiful number of troops, made worse by numerous desertions (King
and Etty 25).
This problem of low recruitment and desertion would become a dangerous precedent that was repeated multiple times in Edward’s attempt at conquest,
occurring almost annually until 1303 (King and Etty 26). After a significant royal
campaign in 1300 when Caerlaverock castle was captured and the Scots were
defeated, the English army soon deserted and a truce was made (King and Etty
26). Similarly, in 1301, when Edward initiated an attack that captured Bothwell
castle with his son, the future Edward II, he again faced widespread desertion after
suffering more financial difficulties, resulting in yet another truce (King and Etty
25–26). Andy King and Claire Etty’s analysis of the situation perhaps summarizes
it best: “Essentially, whenever Edward invaded, the Scots could afford simply to
wait until he was forced to go away again” (King and Etty 26). As a result of these
repeated desertions, retreats, and re-musterings, Edward’s finances were stretched
to dangerous extremes, especially considering the enormous expenses necessary to
feed, in short order, three large expeditions.
In addition to the financial burdens of upkeep and supply, Edward faced a
serious challenge regarding the exhaustion of his soldiers and his people. Wales
was only the beginning of Edward’s military career as reigning king; by the time
the conquest of Scotland came about, the soldiers of England had faced decades
of regular warfare. A decade after his conquest of Wales in 1284, Edward went
to war with King Philip IV of France over Gascony in 1294, suppressed a significant revolt in Wales in the same year, and began war with the Scots soon after
(Prestwich, Three Edwards 26). The toll on the soldiers would have been significant, not merely in terms of the deaths and the need to replace casualties, but also
of physical exhaustion. This fairly short period of time was choked with several
major conflicts, creating an environment of high stress. In similar situations where
a people have been subjected to the stress of extended periods of war, substantial
detrimental effects can be seen not only in the soldiers but also in the general population, where public emotion is strained and tensions run high. It is difficult to
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2018
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imagine that this situation would be any different in the thirteenth century; in fact,
the reality that Edward was able to maintain public morale and the degree of support that he did amid such levels of conflict and expenditure is testament in itself
to the aptitude of Edward as war-maker and lawgiver.
Adding to the issue of exhausted troops was the continuance of the war over
Gascony. Edward was leading a campaign in Flanders against the French when the
Scottish rebellion defeated the English puppet administration at Stirling Bridge in
September of 1297 (Morris 307). Pressure on Edward in light of the defeat in Scotland would have been significant. In Flanders, he was facing infighting among his
men, defeat and desertion on the part of his allies against the French, as well as the
threat of rebellion among locals in Flanders (Morris 307). He remained in Flanders
to defend Gascony, even after a two-month truce was issued with France, while the
earls and barons of England prepared to lead an attack against the Scots (Morris
308–309). In this, Edward’s forces were stretched even thinner until a truce of
two years over Gascony was issued in early 1298, upon which Edward returned to
England and prepared to lead the attack on the Scots (Morris 309). With his forces
now consolidated and able to focus solely on the affairs of Scotland, Edward was
prepared to assert his rule over the Scots, even given the extent of his financial and
logistical difficulties.
Throughout all of the issues Edward faced in Scotland—from a drained
treasury to repeated desertion and retreat, alongside complications in feeding and
supplying massive forces—it is not difficult to see the difference with regards
to his conquest of Wales. However, beyond the vast significance of these events
was one final aspect that caused Edward more difficulty in conquering Scotland
than Wales: the Scots’ level of administrative development. As discussed earlier,
Wales was a relatively underdeveloped nation, which greatly hindered Llywelyn’s
ability to defend himself. Scotland’s circumstances were the opposite. Scotland
was a well-established and, for the most part, unified kingdom (Morris 242-243).
In Wales, many areas that were not exposed to English influence were only just
beginning to develop towns (Prestwich, Edward I 171), while Scotland was founding towns and burghs and already modelling itself after the English system (Morris 242–243). Culturally, Scotland’s kings and nobles shared much of England’s
chivalric society (King and Etty 14). By the time of Edward’s conquest, Scotland
was well recognized by England itself as a civilized nation (Morris 243). Scotland
had a well-established idea of law and custom, as can be seen by their language
in the Treaty of Birgham with England in the late thirteenth century. This treaty,
written in relation to Edward’s proposal to marry Margaret, the child heir of King
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Alexander III, to his own son, Edward II, set what the Scottish saw as guarantees
against the subversion of their independence to England, ensuring that “the kingdom of Scotland shall remain separate and divided from the kingdom of England”
(“Treaty of Birgham” 467). Through this language, it is demonstrated that Scotland’s idea of itself, as well as its laws and customs, was well established as separate and independent from England. That Scotland was far more developed than
Wales as a society is made clear by these examples.
The effects of this social, political, and cultural development are significant
in Edward’s attempt to conquer the kingdom of Scotland. The well-established
towns and, crucially, the relative unity as a nation under a recognized crown would
greatly facilitate the coordination of Scottish lords. Even when without a sitting
king—following Balliol’s capture, a regency of guardians led the kingdom in his
name—the networks of communication and transportation would already have
been established and used to the benefit of the Scots’ resistance, thus enabling
the Scots to more effectively defend and mobilize against Edward (King and Etty
24–25).
Scotland also had a much stronger economy than that of Wales. As previously mentioned, much of Wales still relied on self-sufficiency rather than on a
market economy and its currency had limited use. This was not the case in Scotland. The presence of a market economy and a more widespread use of hard currency greatly benefited the Scottish war effort and posed to Edward a much greater
challenge of conquest (King and Etty 24–27). As has been demonstrated, the financial and political situation of Scotland was far more highly developed than that of
Wales, which made a significant difference in the fortunes of Edward’s conquest,
and the presence of a unified Scotland rendered it much more difficult to capture
than Wales.
In conclusion, the circumstances surrounding Edward I’s attempted conquest of Scotland were completely different from those of his success in Wales
years earlier. The state of the English Crown had changed dramatically between
the two ventures, and this shift was responsible for the difference in outcomes
between Wales and Scotland. Knitted inseparably to Edward’s success in Wales and
military failure in Scotland were the financial states of the three nations. Edward
faced Wales with a seemingly infinite wealth of resources that allowed him to conquer the nation outright, but, in Scotland, years of war and castle construction had
drained the English Crown’s treasury and Edward lacked the resources to sustain
a military conquest. Similarly, in Wales, Edward faced an opponent who was far
less economically threatening than the one he faced in Scotland. Edward also had
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2018
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the challenge of supplying and feeding his armies in Scotland, where he could not
maintain the system of supply lines he made use of in Wales.
Additionally, in Scotland, Edward fought with much larger expeditionary
forces, often more than doubling the size of his forces in Wales, which posed a
far more serious issue in supplying victuals. The cost of upkeep on these larger
forces placed further strain on Edward’s finances and caused, on multiple occasions, widespread desertion in the ranks. Come winter, Edward was forced to cede
most of his meagre gains in Scotland because of desertion. The English also faced
the issue of exhaustion among the troops caused by decades of intense warfare, to
a much greater extent than did the Scots.
Finally, the change in circumstances surrounding Edward’s conquests was
dictated by the type of enemy he fought. In Wales, he found a largely underdeveloped and divided enemy; in Scotland, he encountered the opposite: a united
kingdom, well established socially, financially, and culturally. These differences
in circumstances surrounding each of his conquests made all of the difference to
Edward and had major effects on the wars’ outcomes. It was because of this large
shift in Edward’s financial situation, coupled with the difference in the nations he
fought, that he was successful in his conquest of Wales but failed in his attempt to
conquer Scotland.
Despite the disparity of Edward’s outcomes, it is important to remember
that, in the end, he was successful in asserting his rule over both Wales and Scotland, albeit under different circumstances. Edward was and is rightfully famed for
his military success and his advancement of English law and politics. For him, war
was a necessity, a means to protect what he saw as rightfully his and to expand
his power over others. War was not a method of escapist entertainment but a very
real and very important part of life. Too often modern society is swept up in its
fascination of romanticized medieval war, forgetting that the reality of war was
brutal, ugly, and expensive. It was an endeavour that often involved the significant
financial commitment of the wealth of an entire kingdom. The real war was regularly fought in the ledger book, making ends meet to fund the mere possibility of
changing dominion, borders, and history. In the idealized modern popular culture,
the inspiring and heroic scores all too often drown out the reality: the sound of a
penny, a pound, or a dollar dictating the course and outcome of warfare.
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